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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
TAKING THE CASE FROM THE JURY
See West's S. C. Digest, Vol. 18, Trial, Secs. 134-181.
Demurrer to Evidence: This is mostly of historical signifi-
cance now, as its use was too dangerous by way of admission
on the part of a plaintiff, since he had to join in the demur-
rer and, unless he had a very careful and good attorney, his
case could easily be lost thru his attorney's error. For all
practical purposes "directed verdict" has taken its place,
where no such admission by a party is necessary.
Involuntary Nonsuit and Directed Verdict: At this point at-
tention is called to Circuit Court Rule 30 with reference to a
plaintiff being nonsuited or his complaint being dismissed
in an equity action. As to an administrative body there is
technically no such step as one being nonsuited. Instead there
is only a motion to dismiss. As said in King v. Wesner (1941),
198 S. C. 49, 16 S. E. 2d 289, at page 53 by Circuit Judge
Lide, whose order in that particular was affirmed on page 61:
While perhaps a motion for a nonsuit is not technically
the sort of motion that can be made at a hearing of this
kind, yet it may be properly construed as a motion to dis-
miss the claim on the ground that the claimant had failed
to produce evidence tending to establish such claim. But
even if the same rules applicable to the trials of actions
at law before a jury are followed, it is quite clear that
a refusal of a motion for a nonsuit may be sustained al.
though tho testimony in chief did not make out a case,
where the evidence offered by the defendant or other evi-
dence later introduced in the case tended to support the al-
legations on which the claim was based. But upon a care-
ful consideration of the evidence offered in chief here,
without regard to other evidence, I do not think Commis.
sioner Todd was in error in overruling the motion ....
Can a judge of his own motion grant a nonsuit? Yes, but
he should exercise that power with caution. McCall v. Cohen
(1881), 16 S. C. 445.
At this point, and as it were by way of parentheses, one is
cautioned as to the third paragraph of Rule 18, which says
that a motion to dismiss a complaint or answer because of
lack of sufficient allegations of fact can be made orally.
It is utterly inconsistent with Sec. 10-647, which requires as
to identically the same step "at least five days notice in
[Vol. 11
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writing." Since that portion of the Rule is inconsistent
with a statute, it is of no legal force. The court should do
away with that paragraph.
An involuntary nonsuit can sometimes be a waste of time,
as, for instance, where it is granted in a suit that alleges
both negligence and wilfulness. Eargle v. Sumter Lighting
Co. (1918), 110 S. C. 560, 96 S. E. 909, at page 565 points
how such waste can occur:
At the conclusion of plaintiff's testimony, defendant
moved generally for a nonsuit, which was refused. During
the taking of defendant's testimony, plaintiff's attorney
sought to bring out, on cross-examination of defendant's
witnesses, testimony which he thought would tend to show
wilfulness and wantonness on the part of defendant. The
trial Judge excluded it, saying that he had intended, when
the motion for nonsuit was heard, to rule that there was
no evidence of wilfulness and grant a nonsuit as to puni-
tive damages, and that he would direct the jury to that ef-
fect. Plaintiff's attorney insisted that he had the right to
prove facts entitling plaintiff to recover punitive dam-
ages, if he could, on cross-examination of defendant's wit-
nesses; but the Court ruled otherwise and held, as to that
issue, that defendant might consider a nonsuit granted.
This was error. We have held in numerous cases that, even
though a nonsdit should have been granted at the con-
clusion of plaintiff's testimony, yet, if the deficiency of
evidence was supplied either on direct or cross-examina-
tion of defendant's witnesses, neither a nonsuit nor a
directed verdict could be granted at the conclusion of all
the testimony. It is immaterial from whose witnesses -
whether plaintiff's or defendant's - the evidence in sup-
port of an element of damage or of the cause of action
or defense may come. Either party has the right to make
out or to strengthen his case or defense on the examina-
tion of the witnesses of his adversary. And even if the
defendant's motion had been specifically for a nonsuit
as to punitive damages, and it had been granted, never-
theless, if sufficient evidence to carry that issue to the
jury had been brought out on direct or cross-examination
of defendant's witnesses, it would have been the duty of
the Court to submit it to the jury.
See also Allen v. Atlanta etc. Co., post.
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In South Carolina one can move for a nonsuit or directed
verdict only as to a separate cause of action. Whether wil-
fulness is a distinct, separate cause is a puzzling problem
under the S. C. cases, in view of Sec. 10-678, which allows
negligence and wilfulness to be "jumbled" or pled together.
The cases are so at variance with no one case saying it is
overruling or modifying any former case, that one is left
up in the air.
In Piper v. Am. etc. Casualty Co. (1930), 157 S. C. 106, 154
S. E. 106, Benn v. Camel City etc. Co. (1931), 162 S. C. 44,
160 S. E. 135, Hallman 'v. Cushman (1941), 196 S. C. 402, 13
S. E. 2d 498, we are told that they are separate causes of
action.
Whereas in Barnes v. Ins. Co. (1942), 201 S. C. 188, 22
S. E. 2d 1, we are informed that they are not "independent"
causes.
But in Allen v. Atlanta etc. Co. (1950), 216 S. C. 188,
S. E. 2d the Court said:
'"hile the cause of action for punitive damages under our
decisions may be an independent cause of action it is never-
theless a dependent cause of action in that such damages
can be recovered only after verdict awarding plaintiff actual
damages." And yet the older case of Bethea v. Western Union
Tel. Co. (1914), 97 S. C. 385, 81 S. E. 675, would appear to
hold to the contrary but was not mentioned in the Allen case.
So there is still grave danger in South Carolina as to mak-
ing a motion for a nonsuit or for a directed verdict as to puni-
tive damages. In the event neither of them can be made, the
only other recourse is a request to charge the jury that they
cannot find a verdict for punitive damages and defendant's
attorney better be present when the jury comes in to see that
proper steps are taken should they bring in a verdict for such
damages. As to the attorney's duty see Bethea v. Western
Union Tel. Co., ante.
Is there a Yardstick for Determining When a Nonsuit or
Directed Verdict should be Granted? There is one but exactly
what it is at present gives rise to difficulty. It used to be the
"scintilla rule" which our court in Bethea v. Floyd (1935),
177 S. C. 521, 181 S. E. 721, defined to be "a spark", "a glim-
mer", or "the smallest trace". If there was that glimmer for
the plaintiff, the motion had to be refused. But whether
[Vol. II
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we have the glimmer still or something more definite and
reasonable is another puzzle in South Carolina since about
every other case says we have it, while the intermediate cases,
beginning with Plowden v. Wilson (1938), 186 S. C. 285, 195
S. E. 847, tell us we have the "reasonable inference" rule,
which the Court then said was "more founded on common
sense." As said on page 289:
The matter is thus treated in the case of National
Bank of Honea Path v. Thomas J. Barrett, Jr., & Co.,
173 S. C., 1, 174 S. E., 581, 582: "If it be conceded that
there may be deduced by a process of unusual finesse
of reasoning that there is a scintilla of evidence that
John C. Jones was the agent of John F. Clark & Co. in
relation to the transactions of G. C. Swetenburg, never-
theless there is another rule, more founded upon common
sense and reason, to the effect that when only one rea-
sonable inference, not just one inference, but one reason-
able inference, can be deduced from the evidence, it be-
comes a question of law for the court, and not a question
of fact for the jury."
Judged by either, or both, of these rules, we think his
Honor was in error when he granted the motion for a
directed verdict in favor of the respondent ....
However, "scintilla" seemingly has recently been defined
as "a reasonable inference." Cox v. McGraham (1947), 211
S. C. 378, 45 S. E. 2d 595, while in the more recent case of
Woodle v. Brown (1953), 223 S. C. 204, 74 S. E. 2d 914, we
are told that the "Scintilla Rule" prevails, but it is defined
"not as a glimmer" but that which would "establish the issue
in the mind of a reasonable juror." It seems here that scin-
tilla is defined by reasonable inference. So, can it now be
said that the yardstick is either rule, provided one is defined
by the other? See Howle v. Woods (1957), 231 S. C. 75, 97
S. E. 2d 205, which seems to bear out this conclusion. The
writer always used "reasonable inference" and a number of
trial judges in the State have said they solve the legal puzzle
by doing likewise.
In a criminal case the yardstick appears to be the reasonable
inference rule. State v. Brown (1945), 205 S. C. 515, 32 S. E.
2d 825. As declared therein at page 519:
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between evi-
dence sufficient to carry a case to the jury, and that
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which raises only a suspicion or possibility of the fact
in issue; and it may readily be conceded that this is one
of the border line cases. But, viewing the evidence, and
the inferences which may reasonably be drawn there-
from, in its most favorable light for the State, which is
the accepted position on a motion to direct a verdict -
[cases cited] - we are of the opinion that it is of suffi-
cient probative value to warrant its submission to the
jury.
The general rule is that, if there be any evidence tend-
ing to prove the fact in issue, or which reasonably con-
duces to its conclusion as a fairly logical and legitimate
deduction, and not merely such as raises a suspicion
or conjecture in regard to it, the case should be submit-
ted to the jury. [cases cited]
The office and function of the Court when considering
a motion for a directed verdict in favor of the defendant,
is, not to pass upon the weight of the evidence, but to
determine its sufficiency to support the verdict. Where
there is any evidence, however slight, on which the jury
may justifiably find the existence or the non-existence
of material facts in issue, or if the evidence is of such
character that different conclusions as to such facts rea-
sonably may be drawn therefrom, the issues should be
submitted to the jury. [cases cited]
In a criminal case there is no such thing as a nonsuit by
defendant at the close of the state's evidence. It is either
termed a dismissal of the indictment or a direction of verdict.
No matter what the characterization is, the legal effect is the
same as directing a verdict as the matter is res adjudicata
since the state cannot bring the charge again because of the
second jeopardy principle.
State v. Parler (1950), 217 S. C. 24, 59 S. E. 2d 489, does
not change the rule. There, after all evidence was in from
both sides, the defendant should have again moved for a di-
rected verdict, as required by Circuit Court Rule 76. This
he didn't do, but since it was a criminal case involving human
liberty, the court waived the Rule, and considered the case
on its merits.
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As to the rule in Workmen's Compensation cases, see Craw-
ford v. Winnsboro, 205 S. C. 72, where the court in 1943 said
the yardstick for the Industrial Commission as to a finding of
fact was the "reasonable inference" rule.
See Nichols v. Congaree Fertilizer Co. (1929), 151 S. C.
417, 149 S. E. 162.
In South Carolina where both parties move for a directed
verdict, neither one waives his jury right if both motions
should be refused. The South Carolina practice differs from
that in some of the other jurisdictions.
However, an attorney should know that, if he asks that his
client's case be withdrawn from the jury and be decided by
the judge, he thereafter waives his client's right to a jury.
Stepp v. Nat'l Assoc. (1892), 37 S. C. 417.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE:
South Carolina follows the current of authority in Work-
man's Compensation cases by adopting the rule that circum-
stantial evidence needn't exclude every other reasonable con-
clusion or hypothesis, but a finding of fact can be based on a
clear or reasonable inference. Whitfield v. Daniel etc. Co.,
226 S. C. 37.
The same rule has recently been adopted in court trials of
civil cases, Morrow v. Evans, 223 S. C. 288, thus leaving the
old rule applicable only to criminal cases, where such evidence
must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis. State v. Ed-
wards, 194 S. C. 410.
Therefore, in this state now when a motion is made for a
nonsuit or directed verdict, the Morrow case rule should be
kept in mind, as it necessarily integrates with the yardstick
for either of those motions.
Since the treatises on evidence and the ones on this sub-
ject do not go sufficiently into circumstantial evidence, it
should be called to mind that such evidence is like a chain
that is no stronger than its weakest link.
What is the Rule When the Jury Refuses to Follow the
Judge's Direction? There is no case in South Carolina di-
rectly in point. The writer, as a young court judge, was
placed in a rather awkward position when a jury foreman,
one of the county's outstanding farmers, arose and said:
"Your Honor, I can't sign a verdict for the defendant as I
can't agree with Your Honor."
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As the writer saw it, the juror was entitled to his opinion,
and one certainly did not want to adjudge him in contempt
of court, so the thought occurred to the writer that there was
a very practical way out of the dilemma so he said: "Mr.
Foreman, will you have any objection to signing a verdict in
the following form: Under the direction of the court, we
find for the defendant?"
He said: "No, Your Honor, because the record will then
always show that it was not my verdict as a juror, but one
directed by you."
He used that form and thereafter the writer always gave
the jury that form to use as to a directed verdict, and had no
more trouble. Several circuit judges heard about it and the
writer is informed they began using the form also.
The case of Chartrand v. So. Ry. (1909), 85 S. C. 479, 67
S. E. 741, points out on page 483 that there are times when
even uncontradicted testimony must go to the jury and in
such instances it would be error to direct a verdict. In this
connection see Anderson v. Harnpton & B. R. & L. Co. (1926),
134 S. C. 185, 132 S. E. 47.
Tria by Court Without a Jury: Where the judge fries a law
ease without a jury Section 10-1510 provides that the judge
"shall" state "the facts found and the conclusions of law,
separately," but in May v. Cavender (1888), 29 S. C. 598,
7 S. E. 489, the Supreme Court reduced it to "may", saying
the section was merely directory. The result necessarily fol-
lows that the requirement is waived unless the attorney re-
quests a separate finding of facts and conclusions of law. That
the decision "shall" be filed within sixty days was also held
to be merely directory. However, society doesn't place the
attorney in the embarrassing position of "hurrying up" a
judge, hence if judge runs over the time limit, his decision
is nevertheless valid. Koon v. Munro, 11 S. C. 139. See also
West's S. C. Digest, Vol. 18, Trial, Secs. 387-405.
[Vol. Ii
7
Whaley: Taking the Case from the Jury
Published by Scholar Commons, 1959
